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NOTES & COMMENTS
ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTABILITY: SHOULD RECORD
LABELS HAVE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO REPORT
ACCURATE ROYALTIES TO RECORDING ARTISTS?
"The record business is in rough enough shape that
something might actually change .... If things weren't so
uncertain, so bleak and in such disarray, the industry
would be immovable, even with a gun to its head. If there
was ever a set of circumstances that could lead to artists
making inroads, it's now.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 2002, a Los Angeles judge approved a $4.75 million
settlement in a class-action suit brought by the late singer Peggy Lee.
2
Before her death, Peggy Lee led the suit against Decca Records, accusing
the record label of using questionable accounting practices to cheat artists
out of their royalties for more than four decades.3 Other members of the
class, most of whom are now dead, include the estates of those considered
to be among the greatest musical performers of all time-Louis Armstrong,
Billie Holiday, Patsy Cline, Ella Fitzgerald, Bill Haley, Mary Martin, and
Pearl Bailey.4 The lawsuit represented more than 300 artists, all of whom
recorded for Decca Records before January 1, 1962. 5 Vivendi Universal,
the largest record company of the world's music conglomerates, who
1. Edna Gunderson, Rights Issue Rocks the Music World, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 16, 2002, at
ID (statement by Blender magazine editor Craig Marks).
2. See Judge Clears Music Royalties Settlement, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at B 1l
[hereinafter Music Royalties].
3. See Ann O'Neil, Peggy Lee Class-Action Suit Settlement Stalled, L.A. TIMES, May 8,
2002, at C3.
4. See Music Royalties, supra note 2.
5. Peggy Lee, CITY NEWS SERVICE, June 25, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News
Group File, All.
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acquired Decca Records, 6 settled the class-action suit without admitting any
wrongdoing.7
More recently, a 1960s group, the Ronettes, won a similar judgment
for unpaid royalties. 8 Most known for their song Be My Baby, which was
re-popularized by the 1987 motion picture release Dirty Dancing, the
Ronettes alleged that a 1963 agreement with Philles Records did not give
the record company the right to license master recordings to the motion
picture or to third parties for production and distribution of compilation
albums.9 While Philles Records earned considerable income from such
licensing and sales, no royalties were paid to the Ronettes. 0 The court held
that the Ronettes were entitled to payment of royalties."
In June 2002, members of the Dixie Chicks settled their suit against
Sony. 12  They alleged Sony had underreported sales figures and
overcharged for record company services, resulting in the underpayment of
more than $4 million in royalties.13 The case settled for an approximate
$20 million signing advance, of which the Dixie Chicks must recoup $15
million in record sales to Sony before collecting any future royalties.'
4
Still, there are other casualties in the record label accounting war.
Rock singer Meat Loaf was paid approximately $10 million by his record
company in exchange for dropping his royalty suit, after estimating that his
record company owed him more than $14 million in underpaid royalties.
5
6. In 1958, MCA acquired a portion of Universal Studios' back lot. Tim Carvell, The
Entertainers: They Found Profit in a Nation of Pleasure Seekers, FORTUNE, Oct. 25, 1999, at
272, 276. In 1962, after a series of federal antitrust inquisitions, MCA acquired all of Universal
and its then-parent, Decca Records. Id.; see also Dave McNary, Foes Eye Feds in SAG/ATA War,
DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 5, 2002, at 1. In 1991, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., acquired
MCA, which was subsequently sold to Seagram in 1995 for $5.7 billion. See Robert Keefe,
Tropicana Goes Big-League, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at B10. In 2000, Vivendi,
a former water utility, acquired Universal from Seagram, creating Vivendi Universal-the
world's largest global media and entertainment powerhouse. Vivendi Confirms $10.3B Takeover
of USA Networks, THE RECORD (Kitchener, Cambridge, and Waterloo, Ontario, Canada), Dec.
18, 2001, at C12, available at LEXIS, News & Business, News, News Group File, All.
7. Record Label Accounting Practices: J. Hearing of the Cal. State S. Comm. on the
Judiciary and State S. Select Comm. on the Entm 't Indus., 2001-2002 Leg. 1 (July 23, 2002)
[hereinafter Record Label Accounting Practices 1] (overview by Sen. Martha M. Escutia, Chair).
8. See Greenfield v. Philles Records, 780 N.E.2d 166 (N.Y. 2002).
9. See id. at 168-69.
10. See id. at 169.
11. Id. at 173.
12. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 2 n.2 (overview by Sen.
Martha M. Escutia).
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Chuck Philips, Auditors Put New Spin on Revolt over Royalties, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2002, at A 15 [hereinafter Revolt over Royalties].
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Many other musicians, including Tom Petty, Don Henley, John Fogerty,
Tom Waits, and Merle Haggard also claim to have been underpaid royalties
by their record labels. 16
The current onslaught of suits against record labels is by no means a
new phenomenon. In 1979, the members of the Beatles sued Capitol
Records, charging breach of contract and fraud.17 The Beatles claimed they
were not paid all the royalties due for records sold in the United States.
18
The suit accused Capitol Records of a "pervasive practice of lining their
own pockets at the expense of [the Beatles] through improper and
fraudulent accounting practices,"' 9 and subsequently, for withholding
royalties on as many as nineteen million records. 20  The case was
dismissed, but the Beatles appealed, and the New York State Supreme
Court upheld the appeal in 1988.21 At that time, the Beatles' attorney,
Leonard Marks, stated, "[t]he Beatles do not enjoy litigation, and would
much prefer to avoid it, but there are some situations where it really is the
only thing to do.",
22
Although the court dismissed the Beatles' accounting claims,23 the
court found that a fiduciary relationship existed independent of contractual
relations between the Beatles and Capitol Records.24 The court held that
there was sufficient evidence to support the Beatles' claim that "an injury
separate and distinct from the breach of contract [was] committed and
[was] actionable as a tort., 2 5 As this Comment will illustrate, this case set a
precedent for the music industry.
Most recently, soul singer Sam Moore and others, including the
estates of Mary Wells, 26 and Curtis Mayfield, 27 settled a class-action
16. Id.
17. See Apple Records, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 529 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988).
18. See id.
19. Steve James, Beatles Hold Out for Capitol Punishment, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 1,
1988, at L3 [hereinafter Capitol Punishment].
20. See Apple Records, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
21. See id. at 284; see also Capitol Punishment, supra note 19.
22. Capitol Punishment, supra note 19.
23. See Apple Records, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 281, 284. "A similar suit the Beatles brought
against EMI in Britain in 1984 resulted in a $4 million judgment against the record company" for
accounting errors-not wrongdoing. Steve James, Court Musicians, CHI. TRIM., June 6, 1988,
§ 5, at3.
24. See Apple Records, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
25. Id.
26. Singer Mary Wells was "once one of Motown's biggest stars." See Sue Zeidler, Sam
Moore Has Union Singing Different Tune over Health Benefits, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Dec.
7, 2002, at E 1i. In 1992, she died of throat cancer, in need of medical support, destitute, and
2003]
398 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:395
lawsuit against their union's pension division for $8.4 million.- Moore
originally filed the suit in 1993, alleging that his record label did not
accurately report royalty earnings to the American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists ("AFTRA") Health and Retirement Funds. 29 Further, the
suit accused AFTRA's pension division of neglecting to keep track of
record label contributions to artists' pension accounts.3 °
For years, recording artists have questioned record label accounting
practices.31 It is one of the greatest issues in the ongoing debate over
recording artists' rights.32 Lawmakers are becoming more concerned with
a system that artists and recording industry representatives are calling
"dysfunction[al]."
Many performers and musicians believe record companies use unfair
accounting tricks to reduce their artist royalties, and subsequently, their
healthcare and pension benefits. 34  These artists claim record companies
should have a fiduciary duty to report royalty statements accurately
because currently there is no real penalty if the record companies do not.35
If an artist audits a record company and discovers unpaid royalties, many
recording contracts only require the record company to pay what the artist
is actually owed, if the record company is found at fault.36 Without a
fiduciary duty imposed on record company accounting, the current system
effectively creates "a disincentive for record labels to fully report" royalty
living in a charity ward. Id.
27. In 1999, singer/songwriter Curtis Mayfield died without medical benefits, after being
paralyzed in 1990 by a piece of lighting equipment that fell on him during a concert. Today in
Music: A Look Back At Pop Music, UPI, Dec. 26, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News
Group File, All.
28. Chuck Philips, Singers, Union Find Harmony, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at Cl
[hereinafter Singers, Union Find Harmony].
29. Id.
30. Id.; see discussion infra Part II.D.
31. See generally Connie Chang, Can't Record Labels And Recording Artists All Just Get
Along?: The Debate Over California Labor Code § 2855 and its Impact On The Music Industry,
12 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 13 (2002) (discussing the history of relationships
between recording artists and their record labels).
32. See Chuck Philips, State Senate to Examine Music Firms, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at
C l [hereinafter State Senate].
33. Sen. Kevin Murray, Recording Industry Practices Hearing Summary, at
http://democrats.sen.ca.gov/servlet/gov.ca.senate.democrats.pub.members.memDisplaySpotlightF
eature?District-sd26&ID=2344.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Murray].
34. State Senate, supra note 32.
35. See Murray, supra note 33.
36. Jonathan Cohen, Label's Accounting Practices Under Fire (Jul. 24, 2002), at
http://www.billboard.com/billboard/daily/articledisplay.jsp?vnu-contentid= 1553308.
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earnings to recording artists.37 According to accountant Wayne Coleman,
whose St. Louis firm has recovered millions of dollars in unpaid royalties
for recording artists, "[r]ecord companies use questionable accounting
tactics and contractual provisions to get away with unconscionable
things.... Of the thousands of royalty compliance audits I've conducted
over the past 30 years, I can recall only one instance where the artist owed
money to the company. 38
Proper royalty accounting has a direct bearing on a recording artist's
profitability. 39 It determines whether an artist will make money or owe
money to the record label.40 The record label must recoup all money it has
advanced to a recording artist before the artist is paid any money-known
as an artist royalty-for the recording.41 Recording artists usually see their
royalty earnings twice a year, in a statement where their earnings are added
up and then deducted from the total cost owed to the record label.4 2 The
result is an unrecouped or recouped balance.43
In addition, proper royalty accounting has a direct and significant
effect on the relationship and leverage between artists and their record
company during the recording contract term and any subsequent
renegotiation of the contract.44 To the extent that an artist is unrecouped,
the record company has an economic hold on the artist, and vice versa.
45
Finally, proper royalty accounting is important to the artist's
qualification status for healthcare and pension benefits.46 When the artist's
earnings reach a certain level, the artist is eligible for benefits under the
AFTRA Health and Retirement Fund.47  If the record company does not
37. Id; see generally discussion infra Part II.C (defining the purpose and problems of the
auditing process under current industry standards).
38. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
39. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 2 (overview by Sen. Martha
M. Escutia).
40. Id.
41. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BusINEss 100
(2000).
42. See id. at 100, 164.
43. See id. at 100; see also Record Label Accounting Practices 1, supra note 7, at 2
(overview by Sen. Martha M. Escutia).
44. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 2-3 (overview by Sen.
Martha M. Escutia).
45. See id.
46. See State Senate, supra note 32; see also discussion infra Part II.D.
47. See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1001- 1461 (discussing the rights of employees and their beneficiaries to receive health and
pension benefits); see also discussion, infra Part II.D (describing the AFTRA Code and health
and pension benefits currently required under the Code).
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report accurate earnings, an artist may not become eligible.
In sum, improper royalty accounting significantly impacts recording
artists. Aside from the simple underpayment, it can put an artist in an
unrecouped position for longer periods of time; it can affect the leverage
between artists and record companies; 48 and it can deprive or reduce the
amount of healthcare and pension benefits owed to recording artists in their
later years.49
Vivendi Universal ("Universal"), Sony Music Group ("Sony"),
Bertelsmann Music Group ("BMG"), EMI, and AOL Time Warner
("Warner Group") are the world's five major music conglomerates ("Big
Five"). 50  These conglomerates control more than 90% of the American
music market, 5' and claim they pay artists "accurate royalties based on
time-honored industry accounting practices. 52  The Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA"), a Washington trade group that
represents the Big Five, says that artists are paid in accordance with their
contracts.53 Nevada accountant Phil Ames, who has been performing
royalty audits for thirty years, agrees. 54 "Most of the problems we detect
are contractually permissible . . . .All of these artificial deductions are
embedded in the contract.,
55
The key phrase is "artificial deductions." Because current record
industry accounting systems are so complex and include so many
deductions that have little to do with actual costs and expenses, improper
royalty accounting has become part of the norm. 56 Although the labels
admit that their accounting systems are not free of error, they maintain that
the errors discovered during audits are unintentional and accidental, and on
occasion, they have negotiated settlements with important artists, "simply
to keep [them] happy. 57
On September 24, 2002, the California State Senate Committee on
Judiciary and the Senate Select Committee on the Entertainment Industry
held a joint hearing in Los Angeles on record label accounting
48. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 3 (overview by Sen. Martha
M. Escutia).
49. See State Senate, supra note 32.
50. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
51. Chang, supra note 31, at 15.
52. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
53. State Senate, supra note 32.
54. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
55. Id.
56. See discussion infra Part II.
57. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
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practices58 -the second of two hearings concerning accounting issues.
59
Lawmakers are concerned about these issues because of recent news stories
about famous recording artists becoming reliant upon public assistance,
60
after being denied health benefits or pensions because their royalty incomes
from record sales were underreported, and having to sue their record labels
for proper accounting of their royalty earnings.6' California State Senator
Martha Escutia states:
I am very alarmed by the recent stories in the press about past
recording artists having to rely on public assistance or being
denied pension benefits because they may have been
shortchanged on their royalty earnings during their careers.
Recording artists should not have to sue for what is rightfully
theirs .... If public taxpayer funds are being used to support
artists who were cheated out of their royalty earnings, then we
need to shift that burden back to where it belongs, to the record
companies that failed to pay the artists their rightful earnings.62
Over the years, the relationship between artists and record companies
has grown contentious regarding the issue of accounting practices.
Because record companies and recording artists have not been able to reach
a real accommodation through "marketplace negotiations," 63 California
State Senator Kevin Murray 64 hopes to introduce a bill that would penalize
record labels that purposely underpay artist royalties.65  California
legislators are trying to learn and understand industry accounting
* 66practices. They are currently reviewing recording artist contracts, and
58. Record Label Accounting Practices: J. Hearing of the Cal. State S. Comm. on the
Judiciary and State S. Select Comm. on the Entm't Indus., 2001-2002 Leg. 1 (Sept. 24, 2002)
[hereinafter Record Label Accounting Practices I]] (overview of Sen. Martha M. Escutia, Chair).
59. Murray, supra note 33.
60. See Record Label Accounting Practices 1, supra note 58, at 3 (overview by Sen. Martha
M. Escutia); see also text accompanying notes 26-27; see also note 28.
6 1. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
62. Press release, Sen. Kevin Murray, State Senate Committees to Review Accounting
Practices of Record Companies (Jul. 8, 2002), at http://democrats.sen.ca.gov/servlet/
gov.ca.senate.democrats.pub.members.memDisplayPressRoom [hereinafter Press Release].
63. See Bill Holland, Lawmakers, Others Try To Push Royalty Bill Through, BILLBOARD,
Nov. 2, 2002, at 6.
64. California State Senator Kevin Murray is a Democrat Representative serving the 26th
District. See California State Senate Website, at http://www.sen.ca.gov/-newsen/senators/
senators.htp (last visited Jan. 5, 2003).
65. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
66. Philips, State Senate Probing Record Companies, L.A. TiMES, July 3, 2002, at C4
[hereinafter Probing]. California lawmakers are interested in recording industry practices
because of RIAA lobbying of the California State Legislature, which initially led to an exception
to California's Seven-Year Rule in 1987, and the 2000 "Work Made For Hire Amendment,"
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probing recording artist allegations that record companies "consistently
cheat them out of royalty payments. 67 California lawmakers, versed in
recording artists' rights believe that should Senator Murray put forth a bill,
the Senate will likely approve it. However, after a "spate of corporate
mergers," record companies-owned by some of the largest conglomerates
in the world-appear to be "preparing for a giant political fight. 69
Royalty accounting is a very complex issue. At the September 24
hearing, California State Senator Jim Battin70 expressed this sentiment
when he warned record labels and recording artists to be wary of legislative
solutions to resolve the problems of "an industry whose inner workings are
a mystery to most."'7 1 Senator Battin continued to urge both record labels
and recording artists to educate the public and the Legislature about
recording industry accounting practices, so as to avoid legislatively-
imposed solutions, which in turn do not satisfy the needs and goals of
either party, furthering a situation where no one is happy.72
In the spirit of Senator Battin's statement, this Comment has five
sections that discuss artist rights with relation to record label accounting
practices, including Part I-the introduction. To effectively analyze
recording industry accounting practices, it is imperative that the reader
understand the actual royalty accounting process. Thus, Part II details
current recording industry accounting standards, including definitions for
terms of art such as "packaging deductions," "free goods," "returns,"
"reserves," and so on. Part II also gives an overview of the auditing
process for those artists who are contractually allowed to audit their record
company. For readers familiar with recording industry practices in general,
Part II is merely a review of terms already known; for those unfamiliar,
Part II is vital to understanding the accounting process. Finally, Part II
examines the AFTRA Code and its relation to royalty accounting. Part III
provides a legal definition of a fiduciary duty-when it exists, and when it
does not- through the examination of existing case law. Part IV proposes
a new royalty structure and an overhaul of current recording industry
which was overturned, largely due to recording artist lobbying in Washington, D.C. See Murray,
supra note 33.
67. Probing, supra note 66.
68. Chuck Philips and Dan Morain, Measure on Music Contracts Planned, L.A. TIMEs, Oct.
19, 2001, at C1.
69. Id.
70. California Senator Jim Battin is a Republican Representative serving the 37th District.
See California State Senate Website, at http://www.sen.ca.gov/-newsen/senators/senators.htp
(last visited Jan. 5, 2003).
71. Murray, supra note 33.
72. Id.
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accounting procedures. Ultimately, Part V concludes that a fiduciary duty
should be imposed on record labels to report accurate royalties to recording
artists.
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A royalty is defined as "[a] share of the proceeds from the sale or
performance of a work paid to the author or composer; [a] payment to an
inventor or proprietor for the right to use his invention or services. 7 3 In
the recording industry, a record company pays what is called an artist
royalty to the recording artist.74  Currently, the average artist royalty is
between 12% and 16% of the suggested retail selling price.75 Some major
artists, i.e., "superstars," are able to command a rate between 18% and
2 1%.76 This royalty is based on how many records are sold, not how many
are manufactured.77
A. Calculating the Artist Royalty
Historically, the American recording industry has never used an easy
standard for computing artist royalties.78 In the United States, all artist
royalties are based on record sales.79 Most record companies calculate
artist royalties using either a suggested retail list price or a "wholesale-
based system." 80 Neither method is necessarily better than the other, nor is
the decision to use one method over the other anything more than an
arbitrary decision that each record company makes.
1. Suggested Retail List Price ("SRLP")
The SRLP is an approximation of the price that the retailer, i.e.,
record store, receives from the customer. 81 An artist's royalty is stated as a
73. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 607 (1984).
74. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 89-91.
75. See id. at 108; see also discussion infra Part ILA.1.
76. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 108. But see also Lynn Morrow, The Recording Artist
Agreement: Does It Empower or Enslave?, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 45 (200 1).
77. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 90.
78. Id.
79. See Morrow, supra note 76, at 45.
80. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of Jeffrey Light,
attorney, Myman, Abell, Fineman, Greenspan & Light and adjunct professor of law,
Southwestern Law School).
81. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 90. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7,
at 5 (statement of Jeffrey Light).
2003]
404 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:395
percentage of the SRLP, such as 12% of $18.98.82 Because the artist
royalty is based on a percentage of the SRLP and not on the actual retail
price, essentially, it has nothing to do with the price a consumer buys the
CD for in a local record store.83 For instance, although the current industry
standard SRLP is $18.98, many retailers have a CD selling price for much
less. It is beneficial to an artist and a record company to be paid on a
higher SRLP, but the whole premise of an SRLP artist royalty is based on a
completely artificial figure.
84
2. Wholesale-Based System
Under this system, the artist's royalty is based on a published
wholesale price. Again, this rate bears little relation to the price for which
the major wholesalers like Best Buy or Tower Records are buying the
CDs.85 Discounts, trade allowances, and advertising issues make the
calculation itself, a complex procedure.86 The wholesale royalty rate is
approximately twice the applicable retail rate, subject to other adjustments
and deductions.87  For instance, a 12% royalty based on the SRLP is
roughly equivalent to a wholesale rate of 22%.88
B. Artist Royalty Deductions
Additionally, whether a record company uses wholesale or SRLP
calculations, the record company deducts numerous other items before
paying an artist any royalties.89 Although these deductions do not reflect
actual costs to the record company, they are "traditional elements" of the
record industry, which is the only reason these costs remain "embedded in
royalty computations." 90 Still, there are expenses that record companies do
not deduct from the "royalty stream." 91 For instance, record companies
usually absorb at least a portion of marketing and distribution expenses.92
82. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 90.
83. Id.
84. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 4 (statement of Jeffrey Light).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Morrow, supra note 76, at 45.
88. Id.
89. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of Jeffrey Light);
see also Morrow, supra note 76, at 45.
90. See Morrow, supra note 76, at 45.
91. See Robert C. Schlegel, What Is the Value of an Artist's Recordings?, FAIRSHARE: THE
MATRIMONIAL LAW MONTHLY, Oct. 1994, at 20.
92. See id.
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Certainly, recording artists and their attorneys are aware of these
contractual deductions and how they affect artist royalties; 93 however this
Comment does not address that issue. Here, the underlying issue is the
recording industry's complex accounting system and the errors that occur
within that system. Because these errors seemingly occur more often than
not, accountability needs to be determined. The following discussion of
record industry accounting terms of art exemplifies the confusion and
difficulty associated with the current royalty system.
1. Packaging Deductions
Record companies always take out deductions for packaging
expenses, called "packaging deductions. 94  In theory, the deduction is
taken out to reimburse the record company for the cost of making the CD
package. 95  In reality, the packaging deduction is an arbitrary charge-
usually for much more than an actual package costs to make.96 It is an
artificial way for a record company to lower an artist's royalty97 and raise
the record company's profit potential.
The result of deducting the packaging charge from the artist's
percentage of an SRLP 98 is called "the base price" or "royalty base." 99 The
standard packaging deduction for a CD is 25% of the SRLP.100 Therefore,
if an artist has a 12% royalty l' on a CD with a SRLP of $18.98, then the
artist's royalty base is $14.24 and the artist's royalty per unit is $1.71.02
93. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of Jeffrey Light).
94. See id.; see also PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 90.
95. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 90-91.
96. See Morrow, supra note 76, at 46.
97. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 91.
98. This Comment will calculate artist royalties based on the SRLP system, as it is the most
commonly used system within the recording industry. Id. at 90.
99. See id. at 91.
100. Id.
101. The average artist's royalty is between 12% and 16%. Id. at 108. Some major artists
are able to command a rate between 18% and 21%. See id. But see also Morrow, supra note 76.
This royalty includes any producer royalty or mixer royalty. See generally PASSMAN, supra note
41, at 132 (discussing producer deals and their effect on the artist's royalty). For instance, if an
artist receives a 12% royalty, and the producer has a 3% royalty, the producer receives one-
quarter of the artist's earnings and usually is paid from record one-without having to recoup--
unlike the artist's account. Id. at 137.
102. Whether or not an artist actually takes home the earnings depends upon whether the
artist's royalty account is recouped or not recouped. See generally PASSMAN, supra note 41, at
100 (discussing basic concepts of advances and recoupment).
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Suggested Retail List Price of CD $18.98
Packaging Deduction (25% of $18.98) x75% (-4.74)
Royalty base $14.24
Royalty percentage xl 2%
Artist royalty (per unit) 0 3  $1.71
In other words, using only the calculations discussed thus far, for
every CD that is sold, $1.71 is applied to the artist's royalty account.!
0 4
However, packaging deductions are not the only extra costs applied to the
royalty rate that an artist receives. 105 Record companies have a number of
other expenditures that they require the artist to recoup.
10 6
2. Free Goods
Without understanding the definition of "free goods," one could
easily confuse the term with promotional CDs. Free goods do not include
promotional CDs 10 7 and these goods are not free. Essentially, free goods
allow a record label to give a retailer more goods for fewer dollars.'
0 8
Record companies determined that selling one hundred records at 85¢ each
was the same as selling eighty-five records for $1.00 each-throwing in
fifteen "free" copies to the retailer for every eighty-five purchased. 0 9 By
raising the price on eighty-five records and giving away fifteen free
records, the record labels save money because they no longer have to pay
artist royalties on fifteen records out of every one hundred records sold. 110
Artists are only paid for sold records, not free goods."' Record companies
can deduct up to 25% for free goods. 1 2 If asked, most companies will not
103. Two years ago, the standard SRLP was $16.98. Using the same calculation as above,
the packaging deduction (at 25%) would be $4.25 and the artist's royalty (at 12% of $12.74)
would be $1.53. Thus, in this example, including the income the record company receives for the
packaging deduction, the increase in SRLP from $16.98 to $18.98 increases the profit of the
record company by $1.82 per CD, while the artist receives a mere increase of 18¢. See generally
discussion infra Part IV (arguing record companies should lower their prices to make CDs more
accessible to the modem consumer. Raising prices benefits the record company far more than the
recording artist.).
104. See text accompanying supra note 102: see also PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 100
(discussing basic concepts of advances and recoupment).
105. See discussion infra Part II.B and supra notes 89-92.
106. Id.
107. See discussion infra Part 1I.B.3.
108. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 92.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Record Label Accounting Practices 11, supra note 58, at 6 (overview by Sen. Martha
M. Escutia).
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agree to eliminate free goods from the recording contract, but they will
agree to some sort of limitation.
113
There are two types of free goods: "phony free goods" and "real free
goods."' 4 Phony free goods-described above-are referred to as normal
distributor free goods. 1 5 Essentially, they are what they seem-"nothing
more than a cute way of discounting the purchase price." ' 1 6  Real free
goods are different. Also known as "special campaign free goods," they
are sold at an extremely discounted price." 7 Sometimes, to get stores to
stock more of the product, a record label will give away 5% to 10% of all
records shipped to encourage the dealer to buy the record, "which they
invariably do, since the dealers make bigger profits when they sell [the
product]."' 18 Because these free goods actually cost the record company
money, they bear no royalties to the artist.1 9 Today, about half of the
record companies use phony free goods, while all of the record companies
use real free goods.
120
3. Promotional Copies
Promotional copies ("promos") are different from free goods. Promos
are records that are "given away for promotion . . . don't go to retailers...
and are marked 'not for sale.""121 However, these records can end up being
sold as used goods at local record stores for low prices, and because these
promos are not legally for sale, the artist sees no royalty.'
22
113. Morrow, supra note 76, at 46.
114. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 92-94.
115. See id. at 92.
116. Id.
117. Id. at94.
118. Id
119. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 94.
120. Id. at 93-94.
121. Id. at 94.
122. Id. at 95. In theory, a record company retains ownership over its promotional products
so that any resale of that product is illegal. Technically, a record company can demand return of
a promo CD, but that does not seem to stop used-record stores from selling promos or their
consumers from buying them at discounted prices. Id.
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4. Returns
Unlike the movie business, where "sold" means sold,123 in the music
industry, records are sold with a return privilege. 124 Effectively, a return
privilege means that if Tower Records buys one hundred CDs from a
record company and cannot sell them to consumers, then Tower Records
can pack up the CDs, send them back to the record company, and receive a
full refund. 125 Some record companies have created caps, or penalties, so
that only a percentage of records can be returned, but, in any case, records
can be returned.1
26
In their book, Exploding: The Highs, Hits, Hype, Heroes, and
Hustlers of the Warner Music Group,127 Stan Comyn and Paul Scanlon
describe the Warner Group's return process as a two-day procedure from
the time the CDs are "in the door" at the return plant to the time they are
"ready to resell" at full price.128  In their example, which depicts the
Warner Group's National Returns Center ("Returns Center") in Chicago, in
the early 1990s, Cornyn and Scanlon explain that the Returns Center's
computers keep track of every box of albums that is returned before it
reaches the loading dock.129 Each CD has a return authorization that is
supplied from each record label branch. 130 Cartons of CDs come into the
Return Center on pallets.' 3' Then the pallets are taken to a Holding Area
where employees open the boxes, which contain various CDs. 13 2 The CDs
are immediately identified as recyclable (meaning re-sellable) 133 or not,
scanned in by their bar codes, and then rolled down a conveyor belt where
123. The movie industry has had its fair share of accounting abuses. However, within the
motion picture business, it is generally accepted that "we can actually track how much money the
studio is receiving; and whether they are giving a fair share of that money to the artist or not
giving a fair share of that money to the producer is something we can argue about, but at least we
know how much money has come in the door." See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra
note 7, at 5 (statement of Jeffrey Light).
124. Richard C. Wolfe, Negotiating and Litigating Music Royalties, 69 FLA. B.J. 56, 56
(1995).
125. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 95.
126. Id.
127. STAN CORNYN ET. AL., EXPLODING: THE HIGHS, HITS, HYPE, HEROES, AND HUSTLERS
OF THE WARNER Music GROUP (2002).
128. Id. at 386.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. CORNYN ET. AL., supra note 127, at 386-87. The returns identified as not re-sellable
are ground to dust by hand. Id.
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a pair of spinning wheels burn the shrink wrap off the CD without harming
the plastic jewel case.t 34 "Rubber fingers"'135 pull the shrink wrap away
from the CD, and a vacuum sucks up the waste. 136 Then, the CDs are
rescanned and moved onto "one of ten different aisles," where machines
affix new promotional labels, such as "The New Studio Album,"
"Featuring the hit song," or "Special CD Saver," and so on.137
At the conclusion of this process, the returned CDs are ready for
resale at full price. 13 8 Whether the artist earns royalties on these returns is
based on whether or not the artist is paid on the record companies'
reserves.139 To calculate "net sales," normally a recording contract allows a
record company to deduct returned units, as well as a percentage of shipped
units that may be returned. 140 The artist is then paid a royalty on the net
sales, not actual sales.'
41
5. Reserves
Reserves go hand in hand with returns. They are "probably the most
manipulated royalty item on the royalty statement and in the royalty
provisions."' 142 Because retailers can return records, a record label will hold
back a percentage of the artist's earnings to account for what might be
returned. 143 The record label will eventually pay the recording artist for the
difference, but the reserves account for any potential returns.144 Because
most record companies cannot ascertain the exact number of returns, the
concept of holding back reserves is very common. 145
134. Id. at 386.
135. In this context, a "rubber finger" is a mechanical device used to help remove the
shrink-wrap from a CD. See id. (discussing the returns procedure at one of the Warner Group's
return centers).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. CORNYN ET. AL.,supra note 127, at 386.
139. Wolfe, supra note 124, at 56; see also discussion infra Part I1.B.5.
140. Wolfe, supra note 124, at 56.
141. Id.; see also discussion supra Part H.A.
142. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 123 (statement of Fred
Wolinsky, CPA, Wolinsky, Becker & Hurewitz, LLP).
143. See Wolfe, supra note 124, at 56.
144. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 96.
145. See Wolfe, supra note 124, at 56 (discussing bases for royalties and the concept of
reserves and returns).
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Once the record label determines that sales are final, the artist is paid
on the reserves that were held back.146 For example, if a record label ships
100,000 CDs, they may claim 35% as reserves. 47 This means the record
company only pays an artist for 65,000 CDs, holding back the payment on
35,000 units, which are called "reserves against the returns., 148 Once the
record label can tell that the CDs have sold, which is usually within two
years from the time the CDs are shipped, they will liquidate the reserves
and pay the artist royalties then due. 149 However, if the CDs are returned
and not sold, the reserves are never paid to the artist because they are not
sales, and artists only earn royalties for records sold.1
50
Arguably, in most contracts, the language regarding reserves is vague
and general.' 51 For example, a typical contract may read: "A record
company is entitled to maintain reasonable reserves, based on anticipated
returns.' 52 It is possible to end up with a prolific artist selling millions of
units, with their record company regularly withholding 35%153 every
royalty period. 54  Under those circumstances, withholding 35% is not
reasonable, particularly if "you can show that the rate of return is less than
10%.
,,155
The issue of reserves is not that it is a deduction, but instead that it
defers recording artist income. 156 In testimony before a California State
Senate Committee, entertainment attorney and professor of law Jeffrey
Light said, referring to SoundScan (an actual point of sale monitoring
system):
I can't tell you how many times I have seen on a theoretical million
seller, where the company will ship a million units, and I will see
SoundScan reports indicating that 900,000 of them have been sold,
and the record company still says, 'We're going to take a 350,000 unit
146. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 96.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 11 (statement of
Jeffrey Light). Three of the Big Five use a dollar basis, and the other two use a unit basis to
calculate returns; the net effect of both is roughly the same.
149. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 96.
150. Id.
151. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 123 (statement of Fred
Wolinsky).
152. Id.
153. Current recording agreements typically stipulate a record company may maintain
reserves up to 35%. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Wolfe, supra note 124, at 56.
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reserve because the contract says that we can do this,' even though
that is an inherently unreasonable position, since we know that not
more than 100,000 of those records are going to be returned. They've
already been sold to the consumer, taken home, unwrapped, and
played. 1
57
Records that are held in reserves must eventually be liquidated to
prevent the record company from taking "artificial deductions" unfairly
from the recording artist's royalties. 
58
6. Net Sales Percentage
In the early days, because actual phonograph records were often
warped or damaged in transit, many record labels held back 10% of net
sales to cover the costs of replacing broken records-also known as
breakage costs. 159 Now, CDs do not break easily and are inexpensive to
make. 160 However, some companies still hold back an additional 10% to
15%, paying only 85% to 90% of net sales to cover breakage costs. 16 1 This
is just another way to reduce the artists' royalty and raise the record
company's profit potential. 1
62
7. Music Video Costs
Record companies use music videos as promotional tools to generate
CD sales. 163  Normally, artists are contractually required to reimburse
record companies "for at least half of the cost of each promotional
video."'164 Yet, record companies enter into agreements with video
channels, such as MTV, where the record company ends up receiving
millions of dollars in payments and other benefits that are never disclosed
to the artist. 165 Many artists and their attorneys claim this scheme, which
requires artists to recoup at least one-half of the expenses while the record
company also gleans income from video channels, is nothing more than a
157. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 11 (statement of Jeffrey
Light).
158. Wolfe, supra note 124, at 56.
159. See Telephone Interview with Randall Wixen, Wixen Music Publishing, Inc., Los
Angeles, Cal. (Jan. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Wixen Interview]; see also PASSMAN, supra note 41, at
97.
160. Based on the author's own experience. See Morrow, supra note 76, at 46.
161. See Morrow, supra note 76, at 46.
162. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 97.
163. Id. at 153; see also State Senate, supra note 32.
164. State Senate, supra note 32.
165. Id.
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form of "double dipping.
166
Many managers and attorneys believe that record companies should
share the income with the artist 167 because the artist is required to share the
expense of creating the video with the record company.168  Record
companies disagree. They argue that artists and attorneys are aware of the
agreements record companies make with video channels as per the artists'
contractual negotiations.1 69  In addition, they argue that the fees record
companies receive from the video channels are not profits, but are used to
defray costs and investments of video productions for the artists. 70 Also,
record companies claim videos are a form of marketing, and thus should be
treated like marketing costs, which can be up to 50% recoupable from
recording artists' royalty accounts. 171
8. Record Club Pacts and Third-Party Licenses
Record club ("the Clubs") agreements are also on the list of hidden
costs that affect artists' royalties. "Record clubs are mail-order 'clubs' in
which you join by agreeing to buy a given number of records.'
' 72
Originally, the Clubs were created to sell records to people through the
mail in rural areas where there were no music outlets. 73 Before newer
distribution outlets such as Amazon.com, Best Buy, and Wal-Mart
accounted for such a large portion of retail sales, the Clubs helped "spark"
record sales.
74
Years ago, because record labels used the Clubs to increase sales, the
record labels began to insert clauses into their contracts that required artists
to accept significantly reduced royalty rates for units sold through the
Clubs. 175 Today, almost every record contract says that the income from
exploitation of records through the Clubs is split fifty-fifty between the
record company and the artist because the record company is not actually
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. Usually a recording artist is charged 50% of the expenses involved in creating the
music video. The 50% charged to the account is recouped at the artist's royalty rate. See Record
Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 122 (statement of Fred Wolinsky).
169. State Senate, supra note 32.
170. Id.
171. See Record Label Accounting Practices 1, supra note 7, at 63 (statement of Steve
Marenberg, attorney, Irell & Manella, and outside counsel for RIAA).
172. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 185.
173. State Senate, supra note 32.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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selling records. 76 Essentially, the record company licenses the Clubs to
make the records. 177  The Clubs get the license and manufacture the
records-millions of records-that they sell, bearing their logo and
name. 78 Because it is a license and not a sale, the artist usually gets a
percentage of the negotiated license fee instead of a royalty on sold units.
179
At the most, Club royalties are "half of the [artist's] top-line royalty rate,
but not more than 50% of the [record label's] net licensing receipts," which
is the amount of money that the record company receives from the Clubs
for licensing the record.
1 80
Artists complain that record labels provide very little information
about their agreements with the Clubs, including whether or not the record
label has acquired one of the Clubs through a business merger.' 8 ' This
makes it very difficult for artists to determine during an audit how many
CDs were manufactured by the Clubs. 182 As a result, artists usually earn
very little from Club agreements with their record labels.
183
9. Foreign Royalty Calculations
Foreign royalty calculations vary from territory to territory. 184  In
recent years, large music conglomerates, such as the Big Five, have
swallowed up smaller music labels and foreign distributors as well. 185 If a
United States record label has ownership interest in a foreign distributor,
then most likely, the artist royalty will be higher than the artist royalty in
other territories. 186 Many artists and their attorneys maintain that record
companies use various accounting tricks to reduce foreign royalty
payments to their artists by as much as half.1 87 In a few recent lawsuits,
record companies would not disclose the exact terms of their
176. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 92 (statement of Don Engel,
attorney, Engel & Engel).
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 92 (statement of Sen. Kevin Murray, Member of the S. Select Comm. on the
Entm't Indus.).
180. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 185.
181. Telephone Interview with Charles Sussman, partner, Gudvi, Sussman, and Oppenheim,
Nashville, Tenn. (Nov. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Sussman Interview].
182. State Senate, supra note 32.
183. Id.
184. See generally, PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 169-70 (discussing foreign royalty rates).
185. State Senate, supra note 32.
186. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 169.
187. State Senate, supra note 32.
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manufacturing and distribution agreements overseas. 188  In one breath,
record labels say they pay fair royalties on music sold in foreign territories,
yet in the same breath record labels also say, "it is impossible to generalize
how overseas royalties are computed.,
18 9
For purposes of trying to understand the basics of foreign royalty
calculations, most royalties from foreign territories are sorted into three
categories: Canada, Majors, and Rest of World. 190
a. Canada
Normally, Canadian royalties are calculated at 85% of the artist's
United States basic rate.191 For instance, if in the United States an artist
would receive a 12% royalty, 192 then in Canada the royalty would be 85%
of 12%.193
United States Royalty Rate 12%
x85%
Canadian Royalty Rate 10.2%
b. Majors
Majors are those territories that have significant markets for recorded
music such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Holland,
Italy, and Australia. 194 In these territories, the foreign royalty is typically
60% to 75% of the United States basic rate.195 Thus, where one has a 12%
artist royalty in the United States, the royalty will be 60% to 75% of 12%
in a major territory.
196
United States Royalty Rate 12%
x60%
Major Territory Royalty 7.2%
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 169-70.
191. Id. at 169.
192. See discussion supra Part II & supra note 101.
193. See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 169.
194. Id.; see also Wixen Interview, supra note 159.
195. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 169.
196. See id.
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c. Rest of World ("ROW")
All of the remaining territories are lumped into one category called
the ROW. The royalty for these areas is approximately 50% to 60% of the
United States basic rate. 197 Therefore, where there is a 12% artist royalty in
the United States, the foreign royalty in a ROW territory is approximately
50% to 60% of 12%.198
United States Royalty Rate 12%
x50%
ROW Royalty Rate 6%
10. The Royalty Statement
Besides those described above, there are many other deductions that
are included on a recording artist's royalty statement, 199 but those issues go
beyond the scope of this Comment. Based on everything this Comment has
discussed thus far, a typical royalty statement might reflect the following
calculations:
Suggested Retail List Price of CD $18.98
Packaging Deduction (25% of $18.98) x75% (-4.74)
Phony Free Goods (15%) x85% (-2.15)
Real Free Goods (5%) x95% (-0.60)
Net Sales Percentage (5%) x95% (-0.57)
Artist Royalty Base $10.92
Artist Royalty x12%
Artist earning before Reserves $1.31
Less Reserves (35%)200 x65% (-0.46)
Artist earning on single CD unit2e 0  $0.85
197. Id. at 170.
198. See id.
199. See discussion supra Part I.B; see also sources cited supra notes 89-92.
200. The reserves are eventually paid to the artist to the extent that there are not returns. See
discussion supra Parts II.B.4-5.
201. Artists' earnings are applied to their artist royalty account. See discussion supra note
2003]
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C. The Audit
In the 1970s, record labels began to insert restrictive audit provisions
into their contracts with recording artists.20 2 Today, contractual provisions
allow most recording artists to audit the financial records of their record
company. °3
1. The Process
In a phone interview, 2 4 Charles Sussman of Gudvi, Sussman, and
Oppenheim, an accounting firm with offices in Los Angeles and Nashville,
described the auditing process as follows: First, a recording artist's
attorney sends a letter via certified mail to the record label requesting an
audit based on the specific contractual provisions of their agreement that
allow the recording artist to perform the audit. The letter specifies the time
period that the artist would like to audit, which may be subject to
contractual limitation,20 5 and informs the record label of the auditor who
has been selected to conduct the audit.
Generally, the record label has an auditing department of one or two
people with whom the auditors deal. The auditor contacts the auditing
department to determine the next available opportunity to perform an audit.
Normally, a record label only allows one audit at a time. The audit itsele,
0 6
can take anywhere from one to four weeks. In an effort to defend the
accuracy of royalty accounting procedures, record labels may claim they
have only had seven audits in any given year. However, the record label
decides how many audits it wants to grant a year, so even if one hundred
artists requested an audit, the label may only physically allow seven audits
to be performed.
Approximately six weeks in advance of the scheduled audit, an
auditor prepares a request letter of all of the documents, such as catalogs,
price lists, sales reports, non-royalty reports, third-party payments,
licensing agreements, and licensing statements that the auditor hopes to
202. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
203. Id.
204. Sussman Interview, supra note 181.
205. Wixen Interview, supra note 159.
206. "The audit itself," means the portion of the audit that actually takes place when the
auditor physically goes to the record company's office and begins to audit the royalty statements.
This does not refer to the entire auditing process which includes scheduling, conducting the audit,
and the potential negotiation of an audit settlement. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
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examine during the audit.2 °7
When an auditor arrives at the record label, the auditor sits down with
the auditing staff and learns the record label's accounting system. Then,
the process begins, and the auditor begins to re-tabulate the information as
provided through the requested documents, in order to determine that it was
accounted properly and as per the contractual recording agreement. Once
concluded, the auditor prepares a report to submit to the recording artist
and the artist's counsel, who, in turn, submits the report to the record label.
There are a number of interpretation issues that affect an audit, such as how
the contract is worded and what the parties intended it to mean at the time
the contract was agreed upon. These interpretation issues are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
Once the report has been submitted, the record label and the recording
artist's attorney begin to negotiate what has or. has not been paid
improperly. Once there is agreement about the physical numbers of each
area of the audit, then the parties begin to discuss settlement terms. The
record label's and recording artist's attorneys sit down together to reach a
final amount on which to settle. The settled amount is never fair market
value-meaning the artist never sees what is actually owed.20 8
2. The Problem
Typically, contracts now give recording artists a window of up to
three years to initiate an audit following the release of a record. 20 9 The
process is "extremely time consuming and expensive., 210 The entire audit
process can take a minimum of two years to complete, provided that the
auditor receives all accounting and sales figures in a timely manner.2 1 A
typical audit costs $50,000.212 However, the cost can range anywhere
between $10,000 and $ 100,000.213
207. Auditors must closely examine royalty escalations based on sales because these
calculations are often incompatible with their computer programs. Sussman Interview, supra
note 181. In fact, most, if not all, of the Majors have to manually insert these escalations into
their computer programs. Thus, room for error is very large. Id.; see also discussion infra Part
IV.A.
208. Sussman Interview, supra note 181.
209. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
210. Jeffrey S. Geibelson, Business Managers, in 8 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
CONTRACTS § 148.01 (Samuel J. Fox et. al. eds., 2002).
211. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 3 (overview by Sen. Martha
M. Escutia).
212. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
213. See Record Label Accounting Practices 1, supra note 7, at 3 (overview by Sen. Martha
M. Escutia).
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Although audits are technically allowed, contracts often place many
restrictions on the auditing process.2 14 Considered to be an industry
standard, most record labels prohibit artists from auditing manufacturing
and distribution documents,1 5 both of which are crucial for determining
accurate numbers of how many CDs are sold, given away, bartered for
radio airplay or discounted to the Clubs.216 Further restrictions imposed by
record labels prevent auditors from performing more than one audit at a
time at a record label, which means recording artists cannot share the costs
of an audit.217 Unrecouped artists are hard pressed to be in a financial
position to perform an audit.218 And for those artists that do not or cannot
push for an audit, the current system of "underreporting royalties" merely
adds to a record label's profits. 219
Outside auditors acknowledge that some royalty claims submitted to
record companies following an audit are inflated.220 But, they also argue
that most record companies treat their recording artists unfairly, and often,
record companies are unwilling to provide access to all of their financial
records.221 In fact, auditors accuse all of the Big Five of trying to delay
audits by "refusing to turn over proper documents." 2 2 All of the Big Five
deny the allegations.223
It is not uncommon to uncover around 10% to 30% of underpaid
royalties in an audit.224 But, once an artist performs an audit, getting the
record label to pay is another story.225 Musician Tom Petty routinely
214. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
215. Universal recently announced it will now allow auditors to review manufacturing
records. Bill Holland, Most Labels Mum on Royalty Reform, BILLBOARD, Dec. 14, 2002, at 3.
The Warner Group also announced that it will begin to provide access to auditors to all
manufacturing records. Chuck Philips, Warner Rolls Out Royalty Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2003, at C1.
216. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
217. Id.
218. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 3 (overview by Sen. Martha
M. Escutia). For 98% of recording artists, there is no such thing as negotiating power with the
record company. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 130 (statement of Fred
Wolinsky). Ninety-eight percent of artists are voiceless. Id. (statement of Sen. Jim Battin,
member of the S. Select Comm. on the Entm't. Indus.).
219. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 3 (overview by Sen. Martha
M. Escutia).
220. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
221. Id.
222. d
223. Id.
224. Id.; see also Murray, supra note 33 (discussing the audit process and royalty
accounting).
225. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
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performs audits on his record company. 226 "I personally have turned up
millions of dollars missing [in royalties]-money that I would not have
been paid without an audit."
227
"The company holds my money for five years and I pay an auditor to
collect it," said Merle Haggard, in a recent interview.228  "[My auditor]
catches them cheating me out of hundreds of thousands of dollars and then
the company offers to pay me half of what they owe-with no interest.'
229
Fred Wolinsky, an accountant from Sherman Oaks, California, says
the recording industry's accounting systems are designed to impede the
recording artist.230 The systems are archaic and record company royalty
departments are short on qualified staff employees. 231  He says, "[t]he
companies play this 'catch-us-if-you-can' game with artist
royalties ... only artists with muscle really have the ability to get their
money. 23 2  If Wolinsky's assertion is true, that record companies
continuously underreport earnings and overcharge record company costs to
artists' royalty accounts, then recording artists are left with the incredible
burden and expense of pursuing an audit that ultimately shows the
underreporting and overcharging.233
D. The AFTRA Code234 and Its Relation to Artist Royalties
AFTRA is a union that represents singers and several other categories
of entertainers, including actors and musicians.235  In the mid-1950s,
AFTRA entered into a collective bargaining agreement with major record
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. Arguably, record companies should be responsible for paying interest, especially
when royalty underpayment occurs over and over again.
230. Revolt over Royalties, supra note 15.
231. Id.
232. Id.; see discussion supra note 218; see also Record Label Accounting Practices I,
supra note 7, at 2 (overview by Sen. Martha M. Escutia).
233. Record Label Accounting Practices 1, supra note 7, at 3 (overview by Sen. Martha M.
Escutia).
234. The AFTRA National Code of Fair Practice for Sound Recordings was created in the
early 1950s to protect union artists "who work at scale and overscale, and who appear as both
royalty and non-royalty artists." AFTRA's Sound Recordings Code at a Glance, at
http://www.aftra.com/resources/negotiations2002/soundglance.html (last updated May 20, 2002)
[hereinafter AFTRA 's Sound Recordings Code]. The AFTRA Code covers sound recordings on
CD, cassettes, vinyl, all music formats, books on tape, cast albums, and virtually any sound
recording that uses vocal performance. Id.
235. See Moore v. Am. Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, 216 F.3d 1236, 1238 (11th
Cir. 2000); see also AFTRA 's Sound Recordings Code, supra note 234.
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companies called the Phono Code.236
In 1959, in order to provide health benefits for singers, AFTRA and
the record companies entered into an Agreement and Declaration of Trust
("the Trust Agreement").237 The Trust Agreement created two funds: a
health and retirement fund and twenty trusteeships-ten of which are
chosen by the record companies and ten of which are held by individuals
chosen by AFTRA.238 Under the Trust Agreement, the trusteeships have
"full authority to determine the form, nature, and amount of benefits" to be
paid to those represented by AFTRA.239
At the time of writing, under the Trust Agreement and Phono Code,
members of AFTRA are eligible for health benefits if their earnings equal
at least $7,500 within a twelve-month period for an individual, or at least
$15,000 to cover a family. 240 Artist earnings are based on a percentage of
the gross income they have earned.241 This gross amount is not strictly
limited to recording income; it also includes television income, and any
242other income covered by the AFTRA contract.
Basically, signatory243 record companies are required to pay 9% of a
recording artist's earnings to the AFTRA Health and Pension Fund
("Fund"), with an annual cap around $120,000.244 For instance, if an artist
earns $100,000 in income that is applied to the artist's royalty account, the
artist's earnings for the year are $100,000 and the record company is
required to contribute 90/o-a total of $9,000-to the Fund for the artist's
health benefits. The record company's contribution is based on gross
earnings, which means the record company must contribute to the Fund
regardless of whether a recording artist is recouped or unrecouped.245
236. See Moore, 216 F.3d at 1238-39. The Phono Code is now called the AFTRA National
Code of Fair Practice for Sound Recordings. AFTRA's Sound Recordings Code, supra note 234.
237. Moore, 216 F.3d at 1239. See AFTRA's Sound Recordings Code, supra note 234.
Only record companies that were "signatories" of AFTRA were affected by the agreement.
238. Moore, 216 F.3d at 1239.
239. Id.
240. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 32 (statement of Fred Wilhelms,
attorney and former national director of the AFTRA health & retirement funds).
241. See id.
242. Id.; see also note 234.
243. A signatory is an entity that is signed and is therefore bound by the AFTRA Phono
Code. Telephone Interview with Ann Chaitovitz, National Director of Sound Recordings,
AFTRA, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Chaitovitz Interview]. Every major
record company is a signatory to AFTRA. There are currently 1200 AFTRA signatories. Id.
244. Id. As a result of the pension arm of AFTRA's recent settlement with recording artists,
AFTRA is considering raising the contributions required by record labels from the current 9% to
10%. Singers, Union Find Harmony, supra note 28.
245. Chaitovitz Interview, supra note 243.
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When a record company signs a new recording artist, under the Phono
Code, signatory companies must make a minimum initial contribution to
the Fund to ensure that the artist qualifies for health insurance for the first
246year of the recording contract. Following the first year, recording artists
must qualify based on their gross earnings, whether or not paid.247 Policy
dictates that recording artists should be eligible for health benefits within
the first contractual year with a record company, so that they can continue
to record and create music and remain in good health.248
For those artists who are able to conduct an audit and determine that a
record company owes them royalty earnings, the record company must then
make a contribution to the Fund, based on the recovered dollars.249 Those
contributions are applied to the year in which the miscalculation took
place.2
The RIAA argues that one of the reasons contributions to the Fund
were mistakenly underpaid or not paid at all is because of underlying
ambiguities within the Phono Code itself.25' In 1995, the Phono Code was
amended to eliminate many ambiguities and the RIAA claims there have
been very few problems since then.252 Whatever the case, it is clear that
improper royalty accounting is directly related to record company
contributions to the Fund, which directly impacts recording artists' health
and pension benefits. It is also clear that the entire royalty statement and
accounting process can be categorized as confusing for most, at the very
least.
246. Id.
247. Id.; see also AFTRA 's Sound Recordings Code, supra note 234.
248. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 38 (statement of Fred
Wilhelms).
249. Chaitovitz Interview, supra note 243.
250. Id.
251. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 81 (statement of Steve
Marenberg).
252. Id.
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III. THE LAW AND How IT APPLIES TO CURRENT CASES
The royalty accounting dispute begins with the recording contract
between the artist and the record company, and the royalty terms of that
25contract. Typically, a recording contract spells out the artist's royalty
rate for record sales, royalty deductions,254 and any recoupment and cross-
collateralization clauses,255 which require reimbursement of advances to the
record label before the artist is paid royalty earnings.256 The ways the
contracts themselves are written provide for ambiguity.257  Sometimes,
determining what the contract actually means involves legal issues of
contract interpretation. 58 Ultimately, these legal issues are beyond the
scope of this Comment, but knowledge that they exist is important to the
discussion of fiduciary duty.
259
A. Where the Contract Is Silent or Ambiguous
1. Contract Interpretation
Contract interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of
"written or spoken words" that make up a contract.26 ° The purpose of
253. Id.
254. See generally discussion supra Parts II.A-B (describing various royalty deductions
embedded in the royalty statement).
255. Collateral is defined as meaning "[o]f or being property used as security for the
performance of an obligation." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 139 (1984).
Essentially, a "cross-collateralization" clause means that if a record company pays advances to a
recording artist, the record company can "cross-collateralize" its right to recover those advances
from an unrelated income stream. In theory, while an artist may have earned enough income to
be "recouped" on Album #1, the artist's royalty statement may show an unrecouped balance
because Album #1 and Album #2 are subject to a cross-collateralization clause. See generally
PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 103-04 (discussing cross-collateralization clauses and how they
apply to royalty calculations). For example, if an artist releases two albums on any given record
label, instead of having two album accounts that recoup separately with their own income, the
albums are combined such that any income made by the artist is applied to both accounts equally.
Id.
256. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 2 (overview by Sen. Martha M.
Escutia). For instance, if a record label advances $1 million to $2 million to fund and market a
recording artist, the recording artist can "literally sell millions of records and not receive a single
dime in royalties because of deductions and recoupment clauses." Id.
257. Record Label Accounting Practices 1, supra note 7, 4 (statement of Jeffrey Light).
258. Id.
259. See discussion infra Part II1.B.
260. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 336 (1991).
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261contract interpretation is to ascertain the likely intent of the parties.
Thus, the rules of contract interpretation must be flexible.262 A contract
should be viewed prospectively, in the same manner in which the parties
did at the time of execution.263 In addition, a contract should be enforced
as the parties made and understood it.
The primary goal of contract interpretation in California is to
"identify and give effect to the expressed mutual intention of the
parties. ' '264  Essentially, any contractual language that is explicitly clear
must govern the contract's interpretation. 265  Although the majority of
California courts do not follow the "plain meaning rule, ' ' 266 priority is often
placed on the contract writing in hopes of avoiding ambiguity. 267  A
contract is unambiguous if its language has "a definite and precise
meaning," and "there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion."
268
Once a writing is completely integrated, it represents the entire contract
between the parties. 269 Therefore, extrinsic evidence seemingly becomes
irrelevant because it is not part of the writing.27° However, in cases of
ambiguity, some courts may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties'
intent.
27 1
2. Contract Ambiguity in the Recording Industry
Common law contract rules still govern the interpretation of
272agreements between recording artists and record companies. As stated
above, the precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are
261. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 2001); Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in
California: Plain Meaning, Parol Evidence and Use of the "Just Result" Principle, 31 LOY. L.A.
L. REv. 557, 561 (1998).
262. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 336.
263. Id.
264. Prince, supra note 261, at 569.
265. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1636.
266. The plain meaning rule approach to contract interpretation is based on the concept of
looking solely to the writing, if one exists, to determine the meaning of the contact terms. Prince,
supra note 261, at 568.
267. Id. at 569.
268. Breed v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (N.Y. 1978).
269. Prince, supra note 261, at 570.
270. Id.
27 1. For example, in California, the extrinsic evidence test of admissibility is "whether the
offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is
reasonably susceptible." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc., 442
P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968).
272. Greenfield v. Philles Records, 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002).
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construed in accord with the parties' intent. 73 Therefore, a written
agreement that is clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced
based on the plain meaning of the agreement.274
According to RIAA Senior Vice President of Business and Legal
Affairs Steve Marks, many contracts within the recording industry
purposefully leave some ambiguities because "[the parties are] not able to
reach an agreement on a specific point, but they want to get the deal
done. 275
In almost every audit, recording artists find something has been
underpaid or underreported.276 Many times, the dispute of royalties is
based on interpretive differences of the recording contract.277 For instance,
in the case of reserves, "most recording contracts simply allow for the
taking of 'reasonable' reserves. 27 8  What is reasonable? In these
situations, "established polic[ies] and industry custom[s]" influence the
interpretation of the contract.2 79 . For those artists unable to perform an
audit, what is reasonable is left undefined and unexamined. The recording
industry would benefit from creating some "generally accepted accounting
280principles" to deal with these standard contract clauses.
B. The Law of Fiduciary Duties
Under contract law, in the absence of special circumstances, no
fiduciary relationship exists as a matter of law.282 It is not entirely clear
when fiduciary duties arise out of contractual relationships, but it is clear
that additional factors are necessary to convert a conventional business
relationship into one that is fiduciary.283
273. See Slatt v. Slatt, 477 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (N.Y. 1985).
274. Id.
275. See generally Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 78 (statement of
Steve Marks, senior vice president of business & legal affairs for the RIAA).
276. See generally discussion supra Parts I & II.C (explaining the elements of an audit, its
purpose, and result).
277. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 76 (statement of Sen. Kevin
Murray).
278. Wolfe, supra note 124, at 56.
279. Id.
280. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 77 (statement of Sen. Kevin
Murray).
281. A fiduciary is "relating to or involving the holding of something in trust; held in trust; a
fiduciary agent: trustee." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 259 (1984).
282. Carter v. The Goodman Group Music Publ'rs, 848 F. Supp. 438, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
283. See generally Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Mark I. Mktg. Corp., 893 F. Supp. 285,
289 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing required relationship factors for a fiduciary duty to exist).
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1. The Definition
Broadly stated, a fiduciary relationship is a relationship founded on
confidence and trust by "one person in the integrity and fidelity of
another., 284 In "appropriate circumstances," this type of relationship could
"exist ... between close friends, 285 or when prior "business dealings" have
created such "confidence., 286  When two parties have a fiduciary
relationship, transactions between them are scrutinized with extreme
vigilance, and clear evidence is required that the transaction was
understood, and that there was no fraud, mistake, or undue influence.
"Where those relations exist there must be clear proof of the integrity and
fairness of the transaction, or any instrument thus obtained will be set
aside, or held as invalid between the parties. 287
Fiduciary duties also apply to the principal-agent relationship.
88
Agency is defined as "a fiduciary relationship by which a party confides to
another the management of some business to be transacted in the former's
name or on his or her account, and by which such assumes to do the
business and render an account of it."' 289  The existence of an agency
relationship is dependent on the consent that the agents will act on
principals' behalf and subject to their control.29°
When an "agent" agrees to act on behalf of a person, a fiduciary duty
is created in favor of that person.291 The trust and reliance principles
inherent in a fiduciary duty require agents to conduct their business "in a
manner beyond reproach. 292 Fiduciaries are held to the highest standards
of loyalty, fairness, honesty, and good faith.293  Responsibilities of a
fiduciary include: the duty to act only for the benefit of the principal; 294 to
284. Michelson v. Hamada, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 349 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Pierce v.
Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 240 (Ct. App. 1991); Mellencamp v. Riva Music, Ltd., 698 F. Supp
1154, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
285. See Apple Records, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 283; see also Cody v. Gallow, 214 N.Y.S.2d 127,
129 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
286. Apple Records, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 283; Levine v. Chussid, 221 N.Y.S.2d 311, 314 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
287. Gordon v. Bialystoker Center & Bikur Cholim, Inc., 385 N.E.2d 285, 288 (N.Y. 1978).
288. Hal 1. Gilenson, Badlands: Artist-Personal Manager Conflicts of Interest in the Music
Industry, 9 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 519 (1991).
289. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 1 (2002).
290. See id. "An agent is one who represents another, called a principal, in dealings with
third persons." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (West 2002).
291. See Gilenson, supra note 288.
292. Id. at 520.
293. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
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act only in the principal's name;295 to keep and render accounts of all
money received; 296 and to account in a timely manner upon reasonable
demand by the principal.297  An agent who has received money for the
principal has a duty to keep the money safe until remitted to the
principal.298  In addition, unless circumstances make it "impracticable or
inequitable," the principal has a right to make a "reasonable inspection" of
all accounting books, original data entries, and paperwork kept and used by
the agent to conduct the principal's affairs. 9 9
Accordingly, courts have found that a fiduciary duty exists between a
recording artist and his or her personal manager.300 Likewise, English
courts determined long ago that music publishers are per se fiduciaries.30 1
However, American courts have refused to recognize a fiduciary duty
between recording artists and their record companies.
2. Fiduciary Duties and the Recording Industry
American courts have routinely dismissed fiduciary duty claims
302between a recording artist and record company. For example, in Cooper
v. Sony Records International,30 3 members of the music group Third World
claimed they had a fiduciary relationship with Sony.3 °4 Third World
295. Id. § 398 cmt. a. "An agent who receives money on account of the principal cannot
properly place it to his own credit in a bank, where it may be subject to a set-off or lien by the
bank, or so mingle it with his own that there may be difficulty in tracing it." Id. § 398 cmt. b,
illus. 1.
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 382 (1958).
297. Id. § 382 cmt. b.
298. Id § 427.
299. Id. § 382 cmt. b.
300. See Gilenson, supra note 288. Recording artists hire managers to promote and develop
their career because the manager has "special knowledge and experience" in the recording
industry, which the manager will use on the artist's behalf. Id. But ultimately, the artist has the
authority to "ratify the manager's decisions." Id.
301. See Michael I. Yanover & Harvey G. Kotler, Artist/Management Agreements and the
English Music Trilogy: Another British Invasion?, 9 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 211, 222-23 (1989).
More so than in the United States, English courts traditionally provide dissatisfied artists with
alternatives to challenge contractual agreements. Id. at 232. In addition, English courts have
allowed artists to raise the "presumption of undue influence" if the artist was forced to sign a
"take it or leave it" contract. Id. Generally speaking, English courts more so than United States
courts have applied more "general rules of law to ensure against unscrupulous and oppressive
conduct with respect to the exploitation of artists' skill." Id. While decisions from English courts
lack "clear definition," they are unique to American courts and worth noting. Id.
302. See Cooper v. Sony Records Int'l, No. 00 Civ. 233, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2001).
303. Id.
304. Id. at *17-*18.
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entered into a contract to create master recordings for Sony, which Sony
was to commercially exploit all over the world.3 °5 Third World claimed
"that the relationship with Sony was one of trust and confidence whereby
Sony assumed exclusive control over the Masters" and promised to share a
percentage of proceeds from the commercial exploitation.30 6 Third World
asserted that Sony continued to commercially exploit their work without
paying royalties.30 7 Nevertheless, the court held, "in the absence of special
circumstances, no fiduciary relationship exist[ed]. 3 °8 The Cooper court
distinguished its case from Apple Records, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc.;
because Cooper did not assert the existence of a "special relationship
beyond that which normally exists between contracting parties in an arms-
length transaction."
30 9
In a counter-claim against Sony, members of the Dixie Chicks
attempted to distinguish their case from Cooper, asserting that their six-
year relationship with Sony was a long and enduring relationship, in which
they placed "trust and confidence. 310  The court dismissed the
counterclaim because there was insufficient evidence to create a fiduciary
duty "in the absence of a special relationship. '31'1 The fact that Sony was
responsible for accounting and "collecting royalties" was not enough.312
In Carter v. Goodman Group Music Publishers,313 the estates of the
late composers Calvin Carter, Sr., and James Bracken claimed their music
publishing companies breached their fiduciary duties by not properly
accounting or paying royalties to the composers.314 The court relied on the
decision of Rodgers v. Roulette Records, Inc.,315 which found royalty
agreements are solely contractual in nature and thus, create no fiduciary
relationship.31 6 The Carter court concluded as a matter of law that no
fiduciary relationship exists between a music publisher and composers.317
305. Id. at *3.
306. Id. at *18.
307. Id. at *5.
308. Cooper, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at *18.
309. Id. at *19 & n.10.
310. Sony Music Entm't. v. Robison, No. 01 Civ. 6415, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3100, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2002).
311. Id.
312. Id. at *9.
313. 848 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
314. See id. at 445.
315. 677 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
316. Id. at 739.
317. See Carter, 848 F. Supp. at 445.
2003]
428 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:395
In the late 1980s, recording artist John Mellencamp sued his
publishing company, Riva Music, for underreporting royalties due, failing
to provide royalty statements in a timely manner, and failing to promote his
songs to their best effort.318 He claimed that, by virtue of his publishing
agreements with Riva, they became fiduciaries for his interest. 31 9 The court
dismissed Mellencamp's claims, stating they were based solely on
professional conduct and did not present any "specific conduct or
circumstances upon which trust elements [were] implicated. 32°
The Big Five consistently argue that it is impossible to maintain a
fiduciary duty to any one artist because there are artist priorities, conflicts
with release dates, and competition within the label for artists' releases in
different quarters. 32  And, traditionally, it has been difficult for recording
artists to establish that a fiduciary duty exists with their record company.322
However, establishing that a fiduciary relationship exists has important
consequences because breach of the duty can result in punitive damages,
rescission of contract, and reversion of copyright to the recording artist.
323
If the courts or legislators are not willing to go so far to as to find that
a fiduciary relationship exists between a record company and its recording
artists, perhaps they can do something else. As an example, in Tran v.
Farmers Group, Inc.,324 the California Court of Appeal alternatively
decided that, although there were no "specific circumstances upon which
trust elements [were implicated]," heightened duties should be imposed on
the insurer because of its contractual relationship with the insured.325 As a
general rule, courts have held that the insurer-insured relationship is not a
fiduciary one in the same sense as an attorney-client or trustee-
318. Mellencamp, 698 F. Supp at 1156.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1160. The court gave Mellencamp the option to "repair his pleadings" within
twenty days because the original complaint did not effectively show existence of a fiduciary
relationship.
321. See generally Murray, supra note 33 (discussing whether or not to impose a fiduciary
duty); see also discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
322. See generally discussion infra Part III.B.2 (referring to discussion of cases where court
found no fiduciary relationship existed).
323. See Leonard M. Mark & Jane G. Stevens, Publisher-Fiduciary Issue Gets an Airing,
ENT. L. & FtN., Jan. 1989, at 1; see also Michelson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350; Stokes v. Henson,
265 Cal. Rptr. 836, 843 (Ct. App. 1990). Damages for breach of fiduciary duty are controlled by
traditional tort recovery in general. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1997). In California, punitive
damages can only be awarded if the court finds that the tortious conduct constituted malice,
oppression, or fraud. Id. § 3294.
324. 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Ct. App. 2002).
325. Id. at 735.
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beneficiary.3 26 However, the insurer-insured contractual relationship is
characterized by "unequal bargaining power," where the insured must
depend on the good faith and performance of the insurer.3 27 In Tran, this
characteristic led the court to impose "special and heightened" duties.328
Although the "special" duties resemble those owed by fiduciaries, the
duties did not arise because the insurer is a fiduciary, but because of the
"unique nature of the insurance contract." 329
Just because courts have held a record company and recording artists
do not have a "true 'fiduciary relationship,"' does not necessarily mean
their relationship is not characterized by "unequal bargaining power.'
330
Nor does it mean that "special" and "heightened" duties should not be
imposed on record labels. In the recording industry, record labels control
all of the recording artist's royalty account information, whether recouped
or not recouped. 331 Recording artists are 100% reliant on the record label
to provide them with proper accounting and, if the record label does not do
so, both the financial burden and the burden of proof are on the recording
artist to determine what has been underreported.332 Because artists must
rely on "good faith and performance," record companies should have a
"special and heightened" responsibility and duty to diligently account to
artists their earnings or their unrecouped balances in a totally accurate and
responsible manner. 333 Even if the record company is not a fiduciary in the
same sense as an attomey-client or trustee-beneficiary, the underlying
contractual relationship with a recording artist is "unique [in] nature, 334
and therefore, some heightened duty is owed.
A record company acts in a recording artist's name when it licenses
that artist's music to any given entity, or when the label promotes and
markets that artist's new release. The record label keeps and renders
accounts of all monies received on behalf of the recording artist's project.
Generally, the record company accounts to the recording artist twice a
year-in a timely fashion-as governed by recording industry standards.335
326. Id. California courts have long refrained from characterizing the insurer-insured
relationship as a fiduciary one. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.; Vu v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 33 P.3d 487, 492 (Cal. 2001).
330. Tran, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735.
331. Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 112 (statement of Don Engel).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See Tran, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735.
335. See generally PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 164 (discussing the industry standards for
receipt of accountings).
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Also, a record company is required to keep the artist's earnings "safe" until
remitted to the recording artist.336 In addition, a recording artist has the
right to audit the books of the record company, should his or her contract
provide for that allowance.337
The lack of a tort remedy is the difference between a record
company's mere contractual duties to account to a recording artist and that
of a fiduciary.338 The importance of a tort remedy is its effectiveness in
33creating deterrence.  While a contractual claim against a record company
can be pursued by a recording artist under a breach of contract theory for
underpaid royalties, the end result is not effective because without the
possibility of punitive damages, the record company probably will not be
deterred from making the same error repeatedly in the future.
340
3. The Lack of an Effective Remedy
The lack of an effective remedy for royalty underpayment is of great
concern to recording artist representatives as well as the California State
Legislature.34' Senator Martha Escutia argues, "If artists are not being
properly paid their royalty earnings, [then] that is a breach of contract for
which the artist should have an effective remedy."
342
In almost every recording contract, there is an audit clause that
essentially says, "[I]f I audit you and you owe me money, the most that
you'll ever have to pay me is what you owe me."343 Effectively, this is an
incentive to underpay recording artists. Without a tort remedy, there is no
real damage done to the record company, and there is seemingly no
deterrence or punishment. Although a recording artist may in fact bring a
bad faith claim against a record company, for which there may be a tort
remedy, the reality is that recording contracts create disincentives for artists
336. See generally Murray, supra note 33 (describing fiduciary relationships and a record
company's sole control over sales and accounting data).
337. See discussion supra Part I.C.
338. See generally Michelson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357 ("The purpose in awarding punitive
damages is to punish ... and thereby deter... wrongful acts."). "Punitive damages constitute a
windfall." Dumas v. Stocker, 262 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314 (Ct. App. 1989). A fiduciary duty should
be imposed, making tort remedies available to the recording artist, so that record companies are
effectively penalized for inaccurate royalty accounting, and, so they are effectively deterred from
accounting inaccurately in the future.
339. See Michelson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357; see also supra note 338.
340. See discussion supra note 338.
341. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at I (statement of Sen. Martha
Escutia).
342. Id. (emphasis added).
343. Id. at 14 (statement of Sen. Kevin Murray).
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to bring suit 344 because the contracts themselves are ambiguous, and the
interpretation of certain provisions can be difficult.
345
As a matter of policy, record companies will not agree to any clause
that provides for attorneys' fees to the winning side of a lawsuit.3 46 While
this sounds fairly innocent, in an industry "in which it is almost inevitable
that the record company is in a better financial position to bear the cost of a
lawsuit... that is a powerful disincentive against the artist bringing
litigation in order to enforce his or her rights." 347 Under the current system,
there is no incentive to make sure royalty accounting is done properly, and
there is no penalty for doing it improperly.348 This lack of deterrence to
record companies creates a profit bearing strategy to underreport royalties.
Proper royalty accounting directly impacts recording artists as they
are forced to rely on a record company's accounting data.349 In 1993,
members of The Kingsmen, most known for their 1960s hit Louie Louie,
filed suit against their record company and its assignees for licensing The
Kingsmen's master recordings without providing any accountings or
paying royalties.350 The court concluded that failure to pay royalties was a
material breach of contract "sufficient to justify rescission" of The
Kingsmen's original contracts. 35' The Kingsmen were also awarded
attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, and ownership of the master
recordings.
352
In Forgione v. Crimson Records, Inc. ,353 former band members of the
Soul Survivors 354 asserted a breach of contract claim against their record
344. See id. (statement of Jeffrey Light).
345. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
346. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 14 (statement of Jeffrey
Light).
347. Id.
348. Murray, supra note 33.
349. See id
350. Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., No. CV 93-4672, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23181, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 1997).
351. Id. at *4.
352. Id. at *4, *19. Following the decision, the record companies involved were held in
contempt of court for refusing to turn over the master recordings and continuing to license the
song Louie Louie to a variety of entities, including Funrise Toy Corporation, which designed a
plastic toy jukebox that played the song, as well as to the Carsey-Werner Company, which used
the song in its television program 3rdRockfrom the Sun. See id. at *6-*7.
353. No. 89-4772, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17420 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1990).
354. The Soul Survivors were a 1960s rock band. In 1967, they recorded their first song,
Expressway to Your Heart. Within a few months of its release as a single, the Soul Survivors had
sold over one million copies. Id. at *1, *5.
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company and its assignees for nonpayment of royalties.355 In this case, a
new company acquired the ownership rights of the Soul Survivors masters,
and at some point, all of the Soul Survivors album sales documents from
1967 were lost or destroyed.356 There was no backup of any kind, "no
general ledger, no accounts payable ledger, and no sales invoices." 357 The
Soul Survivors had no choice but to accept the nonpayment of royalties
because they had no access to the status of their royalty accounts.
358
Although no fiduciary duty was found, the court concluded that the record
company's assignees incurred a contractual duty to account and pay artist
royalties. 359 The plaintiffs were clearly owed royalties and the defendants
had not paid them.
360
In Grossman v. Handprints,361 the plaintiff agreed to sell all of its
stock to the defendant for an agreed price.362 "The contract of the sale...
provided that the [defendant]-purchasers would give the [plaintiff]-seller a
promissory note ... payable in installments. 363 The plaintiff alleged that
"in flagrant violation of the terms of the contract between the parties the
defendants ...collected mone[y] belonging to the plaintiff. . . and .
directed customers to disregard prior obligations and to pay only new
invoices submitted by the defendant. ' '364  The plaintiff requested an
accounting, which the court summarily denied.365 The court reasoned that
"the right to an accounting rests upon a trust or fiduciary relationship or,
under a joint venture agreement whereby the seller . ..participate[s] in
losses as well as profits, or, where special circumstances are present
warranting equitable relief in the interest of justice. 36 6 Here, the plaintiff
did not plead that a fiduciary relationship existed, nor did the plaintiff plead
"any special circumstances justifying the equitable relief of an
accounting. ,
367
355. See id. at *1
356. Id. at *7, *10
357. Id. at *11.
358. See id.
359. Forgione, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17420, at *14-'*15.
360. Id. The plaintiffs were not entitled to full recovery because of a statute of limitations
bar, but they did receive prejudgment interest along with net royalties due since 1985. See id. at
*21-*23.
361. Grossman v. Handprints-N.J., Inc., 455 N.Y.S.2d. 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
362. Id. at 853.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 858.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 858.
367. Grossman, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
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If the right and duty to account "rests upon a trust or fiduciary
relationship," then the duty to account for artist royalties should be a
fiduciary one. Under the current system there is no effective remedy for
recording artists if their record company fails to pay accurate royalties.
Even though almost all record contracts explicitly state that "this is not a
joint venture or partnership, 36 8 the royalty accounting process itself creates
a joint venture between the record company and its recording artist because
the company, as the seller, participates in the losses as well as the profits.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR AN OVERHAUL
It is a tough time for major record companies.369 Album sales are
down approximately 20% from what they were in 2000, and the recording
industry is facing the largest retail downfall "since the Great
Depression., 370  As the industry suffers its worst economic decline in
decades, record labels "are under intense pressure to satisfy their
shareholders with quarterly profits., 37 1 Recently, the Big Five and the three
largest music retailers 372 settled a major class-action price fixing suit with
forty States for allegedly participating in "minimum advertised pricing," an
industry practice which artificially inflates the price of CDs.373 According
to the Big Five, during the 1990s, large retailers sold CDs below cost as a
"loss leader" in order to attract consumers who would purchase items.
374
Allegedly, in violation of both federal and state antitrust laws, with
"minimum advertised pricing," "the labels subsidized advertising for those
retailers who agreed not to sell CDs below a certain price. 375  Without
admitting fault,376 the Big Five have agreed to compensate consumers for
the overpayment of CDs from 1995 to 2000. As such, they will pay more
than $143 million in cash and free CDs, i.e., "free goods"-at the expense
368. Wixen Interview, supra note 159.
369. See Jann S. Wenner, Why the Record Industry Is in Trouble, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 19,
2002, at 40.
370. Id.
371. Greg Kot, Music: Artists Challenge Record Industry's Business Model, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 3, 2002, at IE.
372. The three largest music retailers are Musicland Stores Corp., Trans World
Entertainment Corp., and Tower Records. CD Price-Fixing Suit Settled, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct.
1, 2002, at A8 [hereinafter Suit Settled].
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. The world's largest record company, Universal, believes such advertising policies
are legal, and merely settled to avoid the cost of lengthy litigation. Id.
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of their recording artists' royalties.377
Some argue that record labels are merely raising CD prices, and
spending much time blaming artists, Internet downloading, and music fans
as the cause of their troubles, instead of thinking of creative ways to market
artists and CDs to increase revenues.378 These artist representatives claim it
is the record industry's unwillingness to change that is the obvious cause of
these problems. 379 These representatives reason that the industry is "too
willing to put out albums with only two or three good songs" rather than
effectively developing and exposing new artists, and the industry insists on
keeping CD prices too high. g
Rolling Stone editor Jann Wenner writes that "if the labels continue to
blame the public for their own mistakes, rather than lowering prices and
finding ways to effectively deliver music online, then music fans will grow
even more alienated than they already are. And then, by comparison, the
current sales slump will look like a boom., 381  Senator Kevin Murray
agrees: "[A]s the music business reinvents a business model ... it needs the
artists on whom the industry is built to be its partner in creating the
business model. '382 In order for this redefinition to begin, artists have to
feel comfortable that they are receiving fair and accurate accountings.38 3
Thus, the time may be right for a complete system overhaul.
It is time for the California Legislature to begin regulating the
industry because the recording industry itself has failed to police its own
practices and the way it conducts business.38 4 If recording artists' recent
efforts succeed, "they could fundamentally alter the economics" of the
entire recording industry.38 5 The balance of power needs to be shifted away
377. Suit Settled, supra note 372; see also discussion supra Part II.B.2. The companies
"will pay $67.4 million in cash" and will "distribute $75.7 million worth of CDs to public entities
and nonprofit organizations" such as schools and libraries. Suit Settled, supra note 372. Also,
they have all agreed to stop using such industry policies. Id.
378. Wenner, supra note 369. Record labels continue "their futile efforts" to shut down
digital technological advances, such as "Internet file-sharing sites," instead of embracing the
Internet age. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Press Release, supra note 62.
383. Id.
384. See Daniel B. Wood, Musicians take on record companies, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Apr. 24, 2001, at 1.
385. Id. Drew Borst, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., a New York based firm that
follows and analyzes the entertainment industry, says, "These activities have the joint potential to
change the way the music business conducts itself.... This may be just the changing tide that the
creative side has long awaited." Id.; see also Gunderson, supra note 1 (statement by Blender
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from record labels-those who package and distribute music, in favor of
the artists-those creating the music.
386
A. Make Contracts Easier to Understand
"American musicians have [long] lamented their treatment at the
hands of record [labels]. 387  Many artists feel they are left with few
options: give up their rights at an early age or face the risk of never being
signed.388 There is no reason that a recording contract needs to be thirty
pages or more. In fact, some attorneys, known to the author, have been
able to cut the agreement down to four-to-six pages.
Music executives maintain that "artists voluntarily sign 'industry
standard' recording agreements., 389 Therefore, because many records are
unprofitable, contracts are structured such that record labels receive a
windfall from the few profitable albums they release each year.390  The
record label recoups all advances and other costs from the recording artist's
royalties before paying the recording artist.391  Then, while the artist
(through the current industry method of recoupment) essentially pays to
create a successful album, the record company owns the master, has the
option of demanding other albums, cross-collateralizing advances from any
other albums, "and taking profits off of the top," with the advance being
another deduction from the artist's royalty account.392 Generally, recording
artists are left with little or no compensation in return.
393
With the current practice of recoupment, the contract is not easy to
understand, particularly the royalty statement.394 No other industry has this
type of concept as its basis for business.395 In the recording industry, even
when accounting is accurate, there is no way of knowing it. Further, if the
magazine editor Craig Marks).
386. See Chuck Philips, Shaking Up and Turning Around EMI, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at
C I [hereinafter Shaking Up].
387. Wood, supra note 384.
388. Id.
389. Chuck Philips, Seeking a More Perfect Union: Recording Artists Band Together to
Protect Their Assets, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 3, 2001 [hereinafter Seeking a
More Perfect Union].
390. Id.
391. See Joseph B. Anderson, The Work Made for Hire Doctrine and California Recording
Contracts: A Recipe for Disaster, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 587, 590-92 (1994).
392. See id. at 590-91.
393. See generally id. at 591 (discussing recording agreements, royalties, and
compensation).
394. See Chaitovitz interview, supra note 243.
395. Id.
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recording artist is one of the 95% of those whose project has financially
"failed," and thus is unable to bear the cost of an audit, there is no effective
remedy available for that artist.396  Even if artists have the resources to
explore other legal alternatives and are able to sue their record company,
the record company will not be deterred from accounting improperly in the
future. 397 Figuratively speaking, the recording industry is the only industry
in the world where the bank provides a loan, one pays off the loan, but the
bank still owns the house.398
Contracts must be clearly written. Currently, contracts keep artists
tied throughout their career by terms and restrictions that are dictated by
the recording industry. 399  Entertainment attorney Peter Paterno said,
"Record labels operate on the premise that because they take such a large
financial risk and have such a low rate of success that they have the right to
maximize their return when they do score a hit. So the terms are stacked
against the artist.
400
Entertainment law is fraught with conflicts of interest because of the
interlocking web of relationships inherent in entertainment contracts
involving personal managers, producers, record companies, and
distributors. 40 1  At one time, an entertainment lawyer was able to be
adversarial to a record label because there were a lot of different record
labels.40 2 If the recording artist was talented, the lawyer was able to land a
deal at a different label.40 3 Nowadays, with fewer and fewer major labels,
being adversarial to one major label can hurt a lawyer's career.4° For this
reason alone, many artists and their personal representatives will use one
396. See text accompanying supra note 218. Even successful artists are affected. See, e.g.,
Jeff Leeds, Contract Dispute Greets New Head of Sony, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at CI
(discussing recent suit brought by Incubus against Sony for release of contract). "Under current
standard industry practices, Sony Music has been handsomely rewarded financially during this
period while the members of Incubus have received very little compensation from their creative
and professional efforts ... The core question... is whether Incubus 'is entitled to share fairly in
the fruits of their labor."' Id. (quoting Incubus manager Steve Rennie). Considered a successful
group, worldwide, Incubus has sold an estimated seven million records. Id.
397. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
398. Wixen Interview, supra note 159.
399. Chuck Philips, Courtney Love Seeks to Rock Record Labels' Contract Policy, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Courtney Love] (quoting Peter Paterno, entertainment
attorney).
400. Id.
401. See generally Leonard M. Marks & Robert P. Mulvey, Ethical Aspects of
Entertainment Law Practice, COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 605,
619-20 (PLI 1993) (discussing conflicts of interest within the recording industry).
402. Id. at 620.
403. Id.
404. Id.
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attorney for transactional purposes to maintain good relations with their
record label, and another attorney for any litigation or potential disputes
between the artist and the record label.4°5 Paterno continues, "As an artist's
representative, you wish there was something you could do to change that
[the system], but you can't. In this market, there are only five companies,
and they all behave exactly the same.
' 'A 6
"The recoupment method is so ambiguous, so complex, and so replete
with subjectivity that the only real solution is a complete overhaul of the
royalty accounting system. 'A0 7 Royalty computation should be based on
records manufactured.40 8  For instance, if one hundred CDs are
manufactured, and thirty have shipped, the artist can determine that there
are seventy unaccounted for CDs. The RIAA argues that recording artists
would still complain, "Where did all these go? You gave away too many
free., 40 9  However, all of these calculations would be clearly and
specifically written into the contract. An artist would contract with the
record company to determine the percentage of manufactured CDs that
could be used for free goods, promotional goods, reserves, and,
specifically, how many CDs could be licensed to the Clubs 410 for their
distribution. Further, the basic agreement can be modified to match the
nature of a project's campaign-although the underlying agreement is
contractual, it should remain flexible. If an artist or artist's manager and
the record company agree to service a specified amount of radio stations or
promotional outlets because the project's campaign warrants it, then an
agreement can be made to increase the percentage of units allowed for
promos. Likewise, if an artist or artist's representative and the record
company agree to provide retailers with free goods because the project's
campaign warrants it, then an agreement can be made to increase the
percentage of units allowed for free goods (both phony and real), and so on.
Packaging costs should be based on what it actually costs to make a
package, and artists should only be charged for those costs. If an artist
decides to make a CD with custom artwork, the artist can pay for the added
expense. Likewise, if an artist uses a standard package, which costs less
405. See Wixen Interview, supra note 159.
406. Courtney Love, supra note 399.
407. Gunderson, supra note I (statement by Greg Hessinger, national executive director of
AFTRA). BMG says it is going to reduce its recording contract from 100 pages to 12 pages in an
effort to restructure the system. Chuck Philips, BMG to Roll Out Royalty Plan, LA TIMES, Nov.
20, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter BMG Royalty Plan].
408. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 83-84 (statement of Sen.
Jim Battin).
409. Id. at 84 (statement of Steve Marenberg).
410. See discussion supra Part II.B.8.
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than the standard 25% packaging deduction,41' the recording artist's royalty
should not be arbitrarily reduced.
The recording contract should provide a mechanism to determine
whether returned records are royalty-bearing or free goods.41 2 In addition,
"all reserves should be liquidated ... as soon as the return period
expires." 413 The return period should be a standard time-no more than six
months.41 4
Also, record companies should be required to provide foreign license
agreements, general ledgers to verify sales reports, and data in electronic
form, all of which is currently available, and all of which are currently not
disclosed by record companies.415
With the above proposals, the accounting system becomes
transparent. Because auditors already have to manually input figures such
as royalty escalations on sales, as such figures often do not sit well with
[record company] computers416 and current accounting systems, the need to
create a new accounting system appears practical and warranted.
Under a new system, as proposed above, a typical royalty statement
might look like the following:
SRLP $13.98
Standard CD Package 4 17  -1.10
Royalty Base $12.88
Artist Royalty (12%) x12%
Artist Earnings $1.55 per unit418
411. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
412. Wolfe, supra note 124, at 57.
413. Id. at 56.
414. Id.
415. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 125 (statement of Fred
Wolinsky).
416. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1; see also Sussman Interview, supra note 181.
417. An average cost to manufacture 1,000 CDs is around $1.10 per unit. As the CD
numbers increase, the standard cost decreases. When dealing with the Big Five, an initial order
for a recording artist's debut CD could be as much as 100,000 units. Currently, record companies
deduct up to $4.75 per unit from the artists to offset packaging costs. See discussion supra Part
II.B.1.
418. For the above calculation, the author used $13.98 as the SRLP, proposing that CDs
under a new structure be priced for a modem consumer. With an SRLP of $13.98, retailers could
actually sell CDs to consumers for $10.00 or less. Recently, BMG announced a new royalty
structure. See BMG Royalty Plan, supra note 407. BMG's example uses a 12% royalty based on
an SRLP of $17.98. Id. It still takes a 25% packaging deduction, and 2.4 points for "technology
deduction," which creates an "effective royalty of 9.6%." Id. Then, a 20% deduction is taken out
for free goods, identified as "free CDs given to retailers." Id. These are not promos, but rather
phony free goods. See discussion Part II.B.2. The free good deduction leaves the artist with
$1.03 per-unit royalty. BMG Royalty Plan, supra note 407. However, the recording artist still
A CCOUNTING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR RECORD LABELS?
For every unit sold, a set amount is applied to the artist's royalty
account. For every 100,000 units manufactured, a percentage of CDs
should be contractually set aside for free goods, promos and the Clubs. But
for the remaining CDs, the artist will be paid $1.55 for every single unit
sold.
Tracking sales is no longer a problem. For instance, if 10,000 of
every 100,000 manufactured CDs are set aside for the Clubs (or if the
Clubs are designated to manufacture 10,000 units), then the record
company must provide the Clubs' actual sales figures or return figures for
the licensed or manufactured 10,000 units. Under this system, royalty
earnings are always measured as an objective number.
B. Establish a Fiduciary Duty to Report Accurate Royalties to Artists
The State of California has a history of trying to protect employees,
artists, and performers.419 Unlike recording artists, other California citizens
have a reasonable opportunity to receive fair compensation for their
420 rcrigmrservices. While it is true that recording artists have gained more power
over their work,42' they "do not receive an equitable share of the enormous
,422"iprofit they create. The "Industry has systematically used unfair
contracts and the specter of protracted litigation and damages 423 . . . to
prevent artists from gaining fair payments for their creative efforts.
424
The legislature should consider the record companies' duty to account
properly and honestly as a fiduciary one. 425 When artists hand over a
recording to a record company, they repose trust and confidence in that
record company to exploit their creative work in the best interests of the
company and themselves. A duty should be imposed on record companies
to properly report royalty earnings to their recording artists.
has no way to account for how many CDs actually are given away as free goods, promos, or
licensed to the Clubs. See id. This calculation still provides no transparency. See id
419. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 112 (statement of Don
Engel).
420. See Anderson, supra note 391, at 600.
421. Id. at 589-90.
422. A. Barry Cappello & Troy A. Thielemann, Challenging the Practices of the Recording
Industry, 25 L.A. LAW. 14 (May 2002).
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. See Record Label Accounting Practices I, supra note 7, at 112 (statement of Don
Engel).
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In the event that record companies and their recording artists fail to
reach an agreement, legislation should be introduced to impose heightened
426scrutiny on the royalty accounting practices of record companies.
Further, the legislation should allow recording artists the opportunity to
seek punitive damages for "intentional and systemic misrepresentation or
royalty withholding. 'A27  Perhaps an independent accounting board or
agency should be created to oversee the recording business and record
companies' accounting practices and procedures. 428 This board should be
provided with disciplinary powers, and should encourage alternatives to
litigation such as mediation and arbitration.429
While record companies say "[t]he industry has existed in this fashion
for many, many, many years, and we're losing money on over 90 percent
of the recordings that we distribute, and this is the only way that we can
really get by," this logic does not hold up under any level of scrutiny.430
The music business is a risk-intensive business, but that does not mean the
record companies have a right to shift that burden solely onto the recording
artists' shoulders.43'
"We have managed to create a business that focuses on selling records
that do 5 million to 10 million [dollars in] sales, at the expense of almost
everything else," said former President and CEO of London-Sire Records,
Peter Koepke.432 That is why "the big record companies are complete and
utter nonsense, a thing of the past. [We are] keeping them around because
[they have] always been around. But [they are] fast becoming relics.
' 433
426. See id. § 7 (written testimony of Londell McMillan, attorney, and counsel for the Artist
Empowerment Coalition).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. See Record Label Accounting Practices 1, supra note 7, at 139 (statement of Greg
Hessinger).
431. See id.
432. Greg Kot, V. Dion Haynes & Joshua Klein, You Say You Want A Revolution, C-ti.
TRIB., Feb. 24, 2002, at 1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?TS=I-
423.. .2&Dtp=1&Did=000000109654617&Mtd=1&Fmt.
433. Id. See generally CORNYN ET. AL., supra note 127, at 448 (discussing the
transformation of the business caring about music to growth potential and corporate debt).
"There was a time when everyone in the business would sit around and talk enthusiastically about
all the great music being made, no matter what label it was on... John Lennon... Curtis
Mayfield... Velvet Underground... Joni Mitchell. Today all anyone talks about are growth
projections." Id.
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Under the auspice of recoupment, recording artists pay to have their
records promoted and marketed.434 Recording artists want a major record
deal because it exposes them to mass audiences.435 Now, many artists are
realizing it is possible to make more money by independently
manufacturing and selling records without being tied to a record label,
especially when that label has no duty to report accurate royalties.
436
As MTV and commercial radio are narrowing to accommodate only
the most promoted and most expensive music from the labels, recording
artists are turning to independent ventures or agreements where they can
participate in the entire process.437 There is a growing network of
independent artists who sell less records but consistently make "modest
profits" that allow them to continue to produce and record their music.
438
These artists may be the future.
V. CONCLUSION
The recording industry needs standards that require labels to fully
disclose accounting practices to recording artists and possible legislation
that would penalize record labels that underpay artist royalties. By
imposing a fiduciary duty on record labels to report accurate royalties to
recording artists, the onus is on the record company to account properly.
Currently, there are absolutely no ramifications, other than to simply settle
for less than fair-market value, if royalties are underreported. In addition,
financially successful artists are the only recording artists that are
practically afforded the auditing remedy, regardless of their contractual
agreements with the record label.439 This creates serious detriment not only
to recording artists' earnings, but also to their ability to be eligible for
health and pension benefits.44°
AFTRA director Greg Hessinger claims that "[t]he music industry's
current accounting system is sorely lacking in transparency ... . And until
the labels recognize that artists have an inherent right to be given a clear
434. See Kot, Haynes & Klein, supra note 432.
435. See id.
436. Id.
437. See id.
438. Id.
439. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. Even financially successful artists may be
deterred from bringing suit against their record companies so as not to be excluded from future
projects or opportunities. See id. Perhaps recording artists should focus on increasing their
contractual power through the use of their union and collective bargaining agreements with the
record labels.
440. See discussion supra Part ll.D.
2003]
442 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.23:395
accounting of what they are owed, people will continue to have the
perception that they are being cheated."'44 1  More importantly, record
companies need to understand that artists cannot be treated any longer as
though they have no say about their finances.442  This is not about rich
artists who want to make an extra penny here and there." 3 It is about a
dysfunctional system that needs real correction. As such, the only solution
to effectively create deterrence and terminate the long-standing industry
practice of cheating artists out of money they rightfully deserve is to
impose a fiduciary duty on record companies to account accurate royalties
to their recording artists.
Corrina Cree Clover*
441. See State Senate, supra note 32 (statement by Greg Hessinger).
442. See Press Release, supra note 62. As EMI's Recorded Music division Chairman Alain
Levy stated, "There is more pain to come, but the music industry will survive." Shaking, supra
note 386.
443. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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